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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The theory of markets with asymmetric information has been a “vital and lively field of 
economic research” (2001 Nobel Prize committee) for decades.  The classic ‘lemons’ paper 
(Akerlof 1970) illustrated the point that asymmetric information led to economic inefficiency, 
and could even destroy an efficient market.  Since the seminal works of Vickrey (1961) and 
Mirrlees (1971), research on mechanism design has sought ways to minimize or eliminate this 
problem.
1
  In an environment with hidden information (sometimes characterized as adverse 
selection), each agent knows more about her
2
 ‘type’ than the principal does at the time of 
contracting.  In the standard labor scenario, a firm hires a worker but knows less than the 
worker does about her innate work disutility.  Other typical applications include a monopolist 
who is trying to price discriminate between buyers with different (privately known) 
willingness to pay, or a regulator who wants to obtain the highest efficient output from a utility 
company with private information about its cost.
3
 
The fact that agents know their own ability levels while principals may not causes 
difficulties in contracting, as an agent may not choose the action that is in the best interest of 
the principal.  If outcomes are related to actions, firms with complete information could design 
‘first-best’ contracts that theoretically induce truthful revelation of types and generate 
economic efficiency by making the contract contingent on the outcome.  However, in 
contracting under hidden information, the problem is how to induce the efficient action 
without being able to observe the agent’s true type; in this case, it is typically necessary to 
devise ‘second-best’ contracts that lead to separation of types, but which are somewhat 
distorted and less than fully efficient.   
In this paper we report the results of experiments designed to test the influence of 
competition when there is hidden information.  This can be seen as a question of 
organizational or institutional design – what effects do different rules and markets have on 
                                                 
1
 Applications include public and regulatory economics (Laffont and Tirole 1993), labor economics (Lazear 
1999), financial economics (Freixas and Rochet 1997), business management (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), and 
development economics (Ray 1998).  
2
 Throughout this paper we assume that the principals are male and the agents are female. 
3
 One-shot contracts are common in consumer transactions.  In the public sector, government procurement is 
often conducted on a one-shot basis.   
 2 
performance and efficiency?
4
  We examine how differing degrees of relative bargaining power 
between principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency when there is a problem of 
hidden information.   
Our approach is to consider three environments that differ according to the type of 
competition present in the environment.  In our benchmark case, each principal is matched 
with one agent of unknown type.  In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three 
agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by 
two principals.  Principals can choose to offer one of six feasible contract menus, which are 
held constant across our treatments; in turn, agents can select high or low effort, or reject the 
contract menu entirely and receive reservation payoffs.  We derive the equilibrium predictions 
for each environment and include the induced contract menus for each treatment among the 
six feasible choices for the principal.  We examine the outcomes in each treatment, ranking the 
institutions as a function of their relative efficiency, both in terms of effort and the probability 
of trade.  
In this respect theory provides a first answer.  To understand the theoretical efficiency 
ranking, it is important to realize that incomplete information in markets creates inefficiencies 
because the agents have a certain monopoly power.  More precisely, they are the sole ‘owners’ 
of a valuable resource – information about their type.  We first show from a theoretical point 
of view how different degrees of bargaining power between principals and agents, related to 
various degrees of competition in the market, affect outcomes and efficiency.  In an 
environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, inefficiencies remain.  
In contrast, in an environment where agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves 
dramatically and increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the 
agents’ informational monopoly power.  However, this environment also generates a high 
inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria, which may have important 
behavioral implications in the field if people have social preferences such as inequality 
aversion. 
                                                 
4
 Although we use the standard static screening model, it is worth noting that Kanemoto and MacCleod (1992) 
examine the effect of competition in a dynamic environment and find that one obtains the first-best outcome if 
there is sufficient competition for workers, even with asymmetric information.  Perhaps there is some empirical 
analog to this result in the static case. 
 3 
Our experiment constitutes the first test of the impact of varying the relative bargaining 
power between principals and agents on the selection of contracts in the presence of both 
heterogeneous agents and hidden information, and their subsequent efficiency.  Our results are 
mostly supportive of the theory and the major implication is that the bargaining power directly 
affects the choice of contract menus.  In comparison with environments in which there is 
either no competition or a competition among principals, our experiment finds that the 
institutional environment in which agents compete against each other is the most efficient as 
far as we consider the contracting pairs.   
Even though, in general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the 
theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment, there is a 
tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time.  We find 
that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, 
competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. We observe a fairly high 
degree of separation of agents’ types in the choices made in response to the various contract 
menus; interestingly, with agent competition we observe the more able agents strategically 
foregoing the option that would pay them more (if they are chosen), in order to signal their 
type by choosing the option that less able agents should never choose.  Our data also show 
considerable evidence of changes in behavior over time, as participants learn what is effective 
and what is not. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We review the relevant literature 
in section 2, and we describe our theoretical model and derive its predictions in section 3.  We 
present our experimental design and implementation in section 4, with the results given in 
section 5.  We discuss welfare and efficiency considerations in section 6, and conclude in 
section 7. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Perhaps due to the complexity of business relationships, it is difficult to find support 
from field data for principal-agent theory.  While there has been considerable theoretical work 
on contracts in recent decades, empirical tests of the theory have long remained scarce, 
particularly as far as hidden information is concerned.   The Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori 
 4 
and Salanié (2003) surveys show that the econometrics of contracts has recently become a 
burgeoning field of research.  However, the latter study points out that a number of empirical 
tests suffer from selection and endogeneity biases.  In addition, many papers use similar data 
because of a lack of data on contracts.  These difficulties explain that only few empirical tests 
of the hidden-information problem are available in the literature (see notably Cawley and 
Philipson, 1999; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Dahlby, 1983; Dione and Doherty, 1994; 
Finkelstein and Poterba, 2000; Genesove, 1993; Puelz and Snow, 1994; Young and Burke, 
2001).  Given the difficulties inherent with field data in this area, laboratory experiments offer 
a complementary approach that offers some promise, since it is possible to isolate and vary the 
factors of interest while keeping all others constant. 
Previous experimental studies on asymmetric information have typically examined 
contracting with hidden action (moral hazard), where effort is not contractible; these include 
Berg, Daley, Dickhaut, and O’Brien (1992), Keser and Willinger (2000), Anderhub, Gächter, 
and Königstein (2002), and Königstein (2001).
5
  They observe that contracts are usually more 
generous than theoretically predicted.  Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that cheap-talk 
statements of intent help to achieve desirable outcomes (the Nash bargaining solution).   
 There is little experimental work on hidden information and certainly no study considers 
the effect of varying the relative bargaining power on contracts and efficiency.  In Miller and 
Plott (1985), the proportion of buyers varies but it never exceeds one; signaling is observed in 
most markets and market processes allow the buyers to extract private information from the 
sellers.   Lynch, Miller, Plott and Porter (1986) confirm the existence of a market for “lemons” 
in experimental oral double auctions, and Holt and Sherman (1990) do so in posted–offer 
auctions.  Experiments by Brandts and Holt (1992) and Banks, Camerer and Porter (1994), 
however, provide mixed evidence about the ability of subtle equilibrium refinements to predict 
players’ behavior in simple signaling games. In the context of team production, Cabrales and 
Charness (2004) observe that when more equitable menus are proposed, rejection rates are 
                                                 
5
 Other studies involving moral hazard include Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), who examine the incentive 
effects of piece rate and tournament payment schemes, and Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), who investigate 
group incentive contracts. Plott and Wilde (1982), and DeJong, Forsythe, Lundholm, and Uecker (1985) consider 
moral hazard problems with multiple buyers and sellers. Güth, Klose, Königstein, and Schwalbach (1998) 
 5 
lower and agents select actions according to their types.  Charness and Dufwenberg (2008) 
find that communication is useful for achieving efficient outcomes in a hidden-information 
environment when it is possible for low-ability agents to achieve a Pareto-improvement over 
the principal’s outside option, but not otherwise.  
 There are three studies of the dynamic contracting problem:  Chaudhuri (1998), Cooper, 
Kagel, Lo, and Gu (1999), and Charness, Kuhn, and Villeval (2008) study the problem of the 
ratchet effect, where the agent has an incentive to conceal her true type, as the principal may 
use this information to ratchet up the demands for performance in later periods.  Nevertheless, 
principal-agent interactions in the field are frequently one-shot affairs; furthermore, if the 
principal could commit to an ex ante contract, it would be optimal to implement the one-shot 
problem in the dynamic setting.  
One might predict that different relative bargaining power for principals and agents 
should lead to different contract menus being selected.  However, results from the handful of 
experimental papers on the effects of unbalanced competition on the outcomes between firms 
and workers (or principals and agents) is somewhat mixed.  Brandts and Charness (2004) find 
little difference in the gift-exchange outcomes according to whether there are more workers 
than firms or vice versa.  Fehr,  Kirchler, Weichbold,  and  Gächter (1998) find that an 
unbalanced market does not eliminate fairness when contracts are incomplete.   
However, Roth et al. (1991) find that principals capture nearly the entire surplus when 
10 agents compete in a “demand game” similar to the ultimatum game.  Davis and Holt (1994) 
show that the ability of a buyer to switch between two sellers provides a strong incentive to 
develop reputation in a repeated game.  In an ultimatum game with responders’ competition, 
Grosskopf (2003) finds that (the initially-similar) demands in the game with competition grow 
more over time than in the game with no competition.  Finally, Fischbacher, Fong and Fehr 
(2003) demonstrate that the introduction of even a little competition provokes large behavioral 
changes.  A model combining heterogeneous social preferences with decision errors enables to 
predict most of the experimental evidence with various degrees of competition.  Thus, it is not 
                                                                                                                                                         
consider a dynamic moral hazard problem where trust and reciprocity issues impede obtaining the first-best 
outcome. 
 6 
clear ex ante what effects unbalanced competition will have on the hidden-information 
problem, particularly in terms of economic efficiency.  
 
3. THE MODEL 
In this section we describe the theoretical model that serves as the basis for the 
experimental design.  In this game, the principal offers one contract that is intended for low-
ability-type agents and one contract intended for high-ability-type agents; these contracts are 
designed such that the agents have an incentive to self-select the appropriate contract.  We 
vary the bargaining power by altering the relative proportion of principals and agents.  As a 
preview, we note that the case with competition between principals (more principals than 
agents) yields a Rothschild-Stiglitz type of solution, which is invariant to the number of agents 
and generally inefficient.  On the other hand, the case of competition between agents is not 
invariant to the (relative) number of agents.  The presence of more agents relaxes the binding 
incentive-compatibility constraint (for the high-ability type), yielding a level of effort that 
decreases towards the efficient level with the number of agents.  In the limit, the only relevant 
constraint for the high-ability type agent is the participation constraint.  As a result, there are 
no inefficiencies.  
Imagine that a firm needs one worker in order to be able to operate. The profits for the 
firm when it is operating are: 
Π = e – w 
where e, w are the effort levels and wages of the worker.  Each worker has a utility function 
which depends on her ability type j ∈ {H,L}, which is her private information: 
2
2
),( e
k
wweu
j
j −=  
where kH = 1 and kL = k > 1.  That is, the high-ability type of agent has a lower cost of effort 
than the low-ability type.  Thus, only the individual agent knows j, but e is observable and 
contractible.   
From the utility functions of the principal and the agents we have that the first-best 
effort levels are: 
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j
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1
ˆ ∈=                (1) 
We call ˆ e j  the efficient level of effort.
6
  If we denote by U  the outside option of the 
worker (which we assume for simplicity to be type-independent) we can induce optimal effort, 
with: 
{ }LHj
k
Uw
j
j ,,
2
1
ˆ ∈+=    
If the (independent) probability that an agent is a high- or low-ability type is denoted 
respectively by Hp  or Lp , then the expected (optimal) profits for the principal are given by: 
U
k
p
k
p
H
H
L
LE
−+=Π
22
 
In order to make some comparisons across treatments we hold this first-best contract 
fixed in all the treatments.  However, the second-best optimal equilibrium contracts, when the 
types are private information of the agents, depend on the structure of the market, which is our 
treatment variable.  Then the equilibrium contract menu in the Benchmark (B) treatment, with 
one principal and one agent, results from the solution of the maximization program:  
)()(max
,,,,
LLLHHH
LeHeLwHw
wepwep −+−  
subject to 
wH −
kH
2
(eH)
2 ≥U    (IRH) 
wL −
kL
2
(eL)
2 ≥U    (IRL) 
22 )(
2
)(
2
L
H
LH
H
H e
k
we
k
w −≥−    (ICH) 
                                                 
6
 This is an appropriate terminology because in all the Pareto-efficient allocations of this problem (with complete 
information) the level of effort is always ˆ e j . This is so because of the quasi-linearity of the utility function of the 
agents, a common assumption in this field. Thus, the Pareto-efficient allocations only differ in the wages and 
profits of the principal and agent. 
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where (IRj) and (ICji) are respectively the individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints of an agent of ability type j ∈  {H,L}.  As usual in these problems (see for example 
Mas-Colell, Green, and Whinston 1995, ch.14C), it turns out that the active constraints in the 
optimal solution are (IRL) and (ICH), so that the solution is:  
eH
B
=
1
kH
=1; eL
B
=
pL
kL − kH (1− pL )
=
1
kL +
1− pL
pL
(kL − kH )
;
wL
B
=U +
kL
2
(eL
B )2; wH
B
=
1
2
+ wL
B
−
1
2
(eL
B )2
                   (2) 
The high-ability type of agent provides the ‘efficient’ level of effort and obtains utility 
above U .  These informational rents (rents are defined here as the utility an agent gets above 
her reservation utility) are equal to: 
    2)(
2
1
2
1 B
L
LB
H e
k
Uw
−
=−−                            (2e) 
The effort of the low-ability type of agent is ‘inefficiently’ low and she obtains no 
rents, because she is held to the reservation value (the (IRL) constraint is binding).  This is the 
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. 
Assume now that the each principal is matched with three agents (this is the Excess 
Agent, or EA, treatment).  Then an equilibrium contract menu results from the solution of a 
slightly different maximization program.  Given that high-ability types are ‘harder-working’ 
(they have a lower disutility of effort), they cost less per unit of output.  Thus when any of the 
matched agents chooses the contract designed for the high-ability type, the principal always 
chooses her.  If more than one agent chooses the high contract, the principal chooses randomly 
among those selecting the high contract.
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The effort of the low-ability type of agent in the EA treatment, EALe , is closer to the 
efficient effort ( ˆ eL) than that in the B treatment (
B
Le ).  To see this note that both 
EA
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B
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smaller than 
L
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e
1
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 We only write the binding constraints, in what follows. 
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The reason for this enhanced efficiency is that the principal distorts the low-ability 
agent in order to lower the rents to the high-ability agent.  To see this, note that the 
informational rents in the Benchmark treatment (equation 2e) are increasing in BLe , so the 
principal prefers to lower BLe  (thus reducing efficiency) in order to get higher profits.  But in 
the EA treatment there is a competitive pressure on the high-ability types.  In fact, it is easy to 
check that in the general model where the principal confronts n agents, the difference between 
the equilibrium and the efficient level of effort for the low-ability type goes to zero as n goes 
to infinity.  
Nevertheless, there is an additional problem with this treatment.  We have found the 
equilibrium by assuming that the high-ability types assume that other high-ability types choose 
the high contract.  But that is not the unique equilibrium here.  In the second stage, where a 
menu is offered, it is also possible that both types of agents select the low option for the menu.  
If all agents are choosing the low option, it is indeed a best response to choose low for all of 
them.  But in this case, it need not be optimal to propose the menu of contracts specified in 
(3).  In the design of the experiment we provide another menu, which is the equilibrium under 
the assumption that whenever there is multiplicity of equilibria in the second stage, the worst 
equilibrium for the principal is selected.  The equilibrium menu in that case would solve: 
max
wH ,wL ,eH ,eL
(1− pL
3
)(eH − wH ) + pL
3
(eL −wL )  ,  
subject to 
wL −
kL
2
(eL)
2 ≥U    (IRL)                                  (4) 
Ue
k
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k
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
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

−≥−    (ICH) 
where the incentive constraint now ensures that it is dominant to choose the high option for a 
high-ability type (thus she will do it independently of what other individuals of her type are 
doing).
8
  Choosing the high contract when the low contract gives a higher payoff makes sense 
                                                 
8
  If the contract offered by the principal did not satisfy the (ICH) constraint in program (4), there would be a 
pooling equilibrium in the contract acceptance subgame, where both the H and L types would accept the L 
contract.  To see this, notice that the utility for the H type of accepting the H contract would be: 2)(
2
H
H
H
e
k
w − , 
 11 
to reduce competition from other workers.  In fact the ‘attractiveness’ of the high contract 
increases with the probability that a competing worker also chooses the high option.  So the 
worst-case scenario for the principal is when no competitor chooses the high contract.  If even 
in that case a high type should choose the high over the low contract, then it is dominant for a 
high-ability type to choose the high option, and that is exactly what the ICH constraint in 
equation (4) does.  
   Finally, we also have a treatment (Excess Principals, or EP) where several principals 
compete for one agent.  In that case, the equilibrium of the game is such that the principals 
make zero profits for each type of contract, the low-ability agent gets an undistorted contract 
and the high-ability agent is held to her Incentive Compatibility constraint (see e.g. Mas-
Colell, Green and Whinston 1995, ch.14D). 
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since by being the only agent departing from the pooling strategy, he would guarantee being chosen.  On the other 
hand, if he chose to accept the L contract he would get a utility of: Ue
k
w
L
H
L
3
2
)(
23
1 2 +





− , since he would only 
be chosen one-third of the time.  Thus, if the (ICH) constraint in program (4) is violated it is indeed optimal for 
the H type to pool with the L type.  If the pooling equilibrium is always selected when available, the optimal way 
to screen types is given by the solution to (4).  As usual, one still has to check that screening types is optimal for 
the principal. 
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We implemented the theoretical model in our experiment by choosing a single set of 
six menus allowable in all contracts.  For the parameter values kL =2, kH =1, pL =1/2, equation 
(3) leads to menu 1, equation (4) induces menu 2, equation (2) leads to menu 3, and equation 
(5) induces menu 6.  We provide the details of these mappings into experimental payoffs in 
section 3.  In addition we chose two non-equilibrium menus, in order to provide a richer 
contractual environment.  Menu 4 is similar to menu 3, but has a little more effort for the low-
ability type, and respects the IC constraint for the high-ability type.  Menu 5 is fully efficient, 
for both types.   
Each menu consisted of a choice of two (enforceable) effort levels and payments that 
depend on the type of agent involved; if neither choice seemed attractive to the agent, she 
could veto the contract menu.  We chose kL = 2 for all menus, in order to give relatively large 
rents to the high-ability type (under her preferred contracts).  The parameters, efforts, and 
wages for the six different menus in the experiment are summarized in Table 1: 
Table 1 – Parameter Values 
Menu kL pL eH eL wH wL 
1 2 1/2 1 0.36 0.64 0.25 
2 2 1/2 1 0.23 0.64 0.18 
3 2 1/2 1 0.33 0.70 0.25 
4 2 1/2 1 0.4 0.75 0.33 
5 2 1/2 1 0.50 0.85 0.44 
6 2 1/2 1.50 0.50 1.50 0.50 
 
One of the criticisms of models of contract design with hidden information is that the 
contract menus are more ‘complex’ than one observes in reality.  In an environment like ours, 
these often employ a nonlinear structure and a very large number of possible choices of pairs 
of wages and efforts.  Using a continuous strategy space would be quite complicated to design 
for the principal, and even the choice of the agent would not be simple without adding much 
insight; this would also make the data analysis problematic.  We have selected a relatively 
small number of menus of contracts; since they include all forms of equilibrium in some 
versions of the game, this number is sufficiently large for exploring how the choice of 
contracts is affected by relative bargaining power.   While we have selected a very simple 
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structure (only two types), we feel that a ‘simple’ menu can serve as an approximation for a 
full schedule.  As Wilson (1993) points out (p. 146) in a representative example: “The firm’s 
profits from the five-part and two-part tariffs are 98.8% and 88.9% of the profits from the 
nonlinear tariff.”  
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We conducted three different treatments, which differed according to the numbers of 
principals and agents in the treatment to study how offered contracts depend on the structure 
of bargaining power.  In our B treatment, there were 10 principals and 10 agents in each 
session.  In the EA treatment, there were four principals and 12 agents, while in the EP 
treatment, there were 12 principals and six agents.
9
  In all cases, there were equal numbers of 
high-ability (H) agents and low-ability (L) agents and this was made common knowledge 
among the participants.  In order to observe roughly similar numbers of observations 
(matches) in each treatment, we conducted four sessions of the EA treatment, three sessions of 
the EP treatment, and two sessions of the B treatment.  Each session consisted of 40 periods of 
play to allow for possible learning dynamics, with random and anonymous re-matching after 
every period.  The re-matching procedure was common information to the participants.   
The organization of our sessions is summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 – Treatments and sessions 
Participants per session 
Treatment 
Principals H-agents L-agents 
Sessions Periods Observations 
Benchmark  10 5 5 2 40 800 
Excess Agent 4 6 6 4 40 640 
Excess Principal 12 3 3 3 40 720 
Total 72 43 43 9 - 2160 
 
The sessions were conducted at the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique 
                                                 
9
 We chose three agents per principal in the EA treatment because the theoretical model shows that the distortion 
between the efficient level of effort and the equilibrium effort reduces in the number of competing agents; in 
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(GATE), Lyon, France. Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses in local 
Engineering and Business schools using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).  Some had participated in 
previous experiments, but they were all inexperienced in this type of experiment.  No one 
participated in more than one session of the study.  On average, a session lasted 60 minutes, 
including initial instructions and payment.  The experiment was computerized using the 
REGATE program developed at GATE (Zeiliger, 2000).    
The participants were privately informed of their roles; agents were also informed of 
their type.  One’s role and/or type were kept constant throughout the session.  The participants 
also knew that there were the same number of L and H agents in the room.  In our B treatment, 
the “proposer” (principal) first makes a selection from among the six “offers” (feasible 
contract menus).  The “responder” (agent) is informed of this choice, and then selects “option 
X” (high contract), “option Y” (low contract), or rejects the contract menu.  Each person then 
learns his or her payoff and play then continues on to the next period.  The sequence in the EA 
treatment is similar, except that the principal is informed of the options chosen by each of the 
three agents and then selects one of these agents.  No agent is informed about the choices of 
the two other agents. The EP treatment has the same sequence as the B treatment, with the 
proviso that an agent can accept at most one offer from the two principals with whom she is 
paired. When both principals make the same offer, the agent chooses at random between them 
if she is willing to accept the offer.  The principal is not informed of the offer of the other 
principal. 
We used the parameter values in Table 1 to generate experimental payoffs for the 
feasible contract menus.  We first derived the payoffs from these parameters to three decimals 
and then multiplied these by one thousand.  We next rounded these payoffs to the nearest 
multiple of 5.  In the case of the principals, we added 250 to each of the non-rejection payoffs; 
this reflects the notion that setting up the firm requires some capital, and the minimum level of 
revenues that are needed to recoup the cost of capital is 250.  In the case of the agents, we 
added 10 to each non-rejection payoff, in order to provide some minimal separation (avoiding 
the possibility of equilibrium failure due to indifference) between the payoff for a low agent 
                                                                                                                                                         
addition, it increases the probability to be matched with at least one high agent. In the EP treatment, we chose to 
match two principals with one agent, as the theoretical predictions are unaffected by adding more principals. 
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who accepts the least favorable offer and her payoff from rejecting the contract menu in its 
entirety.
10
  Unmatched principals or agents received 125 points in the period.
11
  This process 
leads to Table 3 that was distributed to the subjects to help them to make their decisions 
(except that the term  “menu” was replaced by that of “offer”).12 
We used a conversion rate of 100 points for each Euro.  At the end of each session, we 
selected (at random) four of the 40 periods for actual payment.  In this way, we avoided 
possible income effects from having already accumulated a known amount of money in the 
session.   The average payoff was 14.9 Euros in the B treatment, and 13.5 Euros in both the EA 
and the EP treatments; on average the principals received 17 Euros, the high-ability agents 13 
Euros and the low-ability agents 10 Euros, including a four Euro show-up fee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 As it happens, we inadvertently added 20 points to the L payoffs from option Y with menu 4.  Perhaps this 
turns out to be useful for testing what is needed to obtain efficiency. The reason is that even with this extra kick, 
the B treatment is least efficient once rejections are considered. Thus, there is an argument that competition 
between agents is good for efficiency because it reduces informational rents, both in theory and in practice. And 
that principal competition enhances efficiency as it reduces the envy-driven rejections that hurt efficiency in the 
benchmark. 
11
 We note that adding the same constant to the payoffs for all agents or to the payoffs for all principals cannot 
change the equilibrium, since these are Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. 
12
 See the instructions in Appendix A. 
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Table 3 – Payoff Table 
 Option X Option Y Reject 
                      P  610 355 125 
    Menu 1     H 150 200 125 
                      L -350 135 125 
   
                      P  605 305 125 
    Menu 2     H 155 160 125 
                      L -345 135 125 
   
                      P  550 335 125 
    Menu 3     H 210 200 125 
                      L -310 145 125 
   
                      P  500 350 125 
    Menu 4     H 260 230 125 
                      L -240 160 125 
   
                      P  400 310 125 
    Menu 5     H 360 325 125 
                      L -140 200 125 
   
                      P  250 250 125 
    Menu 6     H 385 385 125 
                      L -740 260 125 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
An overview of our experimental results is that we find substantial treatment effects in 
our sessions, with large differences in the contract menus offered and accepted, substantially 
in line with the equilibrium predictions.  The menus that are offered (and accepted) evolve 
over time.  In general, rejections and competition drive behavior.  We first give descriptive 
statistics for principal behavior and agent behavior, supplemented with charts.  We then 
consider the determinants of such behavior, providing statistical tests and regression analysis. 
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5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Principal behavior 
While there is certainly some heterogeneity present among the principals, we do 
observe some clear patterns and differences for the menus chosen in each treatment.  We list 
the menus offered in each treatment in the left panel of Table 4 while the right panel displays 
the average ex post principals’ payoffs by treatment. 
 
Table 4 – Menus offered and principal’s payoffs, by treatment  
Menus offered Average ex post principal’s payoffs 
Menu 
B treatment  EA treatment EP treatment B treatment  EA treatment EP treatment 
1 89 (11.12) 181 (28.28) 56 (3.89) 270 (194)  516 (527) 146 (125) 
2 17 (2.12) 34 (5.31) 28 (1.94) 210 (215)  528 (527) 125 (125) 
3 242 (30.25) 348 (54.38) 57 (4.96) 334 (318)  520 (519) 147 (125) 
4 361 (45.13) 58 (9.06) 136 (9.44) 392 (384)  478 (500) 180 (170) 
5 75 (9.38) 16 (2.50) 490 (34.03) 346 (353)  372 (---) 219 (185) 
6 16 (2.00)   3 (0.47) 673 (46.74) 250 (250)  250 (250) 214 (205) 
Total 800 (100) 640 (100) 1440 (100) 350 510 206 
Note: In the left panel, equilibrium menus are in bold and percentages are in parentheses.  
         In the right panel, the payoffs for the last eight periods are in parentheses. 
 
The EA treatment has the ‘lowest’ contract menus (the ones most favorable to the 
principal), the EP treatment has the ‘highest’ menus (the ones most favorable to the agents), 
and the B treatment features intermediate menus.  There is some support for the equilibrium 
predictions, as 30% of the menus offered in the B treatment, 34% of the menus offered in the 
EA treatment, and 47% of the menus offered in treatment EP are equilibrium menus (menus 1 
and 2 with EA, menu 3 with B, and menu 6 with EP).  However, menu 4 is the most common 
choice in the B treatment and menu 3 is the most common choice in the EA treatment.   
As menu 3 has a more egalitarian distribution than menu 1 (EA treatment) and also 
provides greater efficiency (higher total payoffs), one might suspect that social preferences 
such as those expressed in the Charness and Rabin (2002) model play a role here; a similar 
comment applies vis-à-vis menu 4 and menu 3 (B treatment).  However, to the extent that 
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these represent social preferences on the part of the principals, we should expect to see these 
choices from the beginning.  Instead, the menu offered evolves over time (see Figures 1-3). 
Figure 1: Menu Offered over Time, Benchmark 
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Figure 2: Menu Offered over Time, EA 
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Figure 3: Menu Offered over Time, EP 
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In each of these treatments, there is some distribution across menus in the initial 
periods, but we typically see that two menus comprise the great majority of the menus offered 
thereafter in each treatment.  In every case, it is the ‘higher’ menu that grows in frequency 
over time.  Thus, it seems that some other force is inducing principals to choose more 
generous menus over time, even though principals’ social preferences may perhaps account for 
some of the generous menu choices.  In every treatment, one menu predominates in the last 
group of periods, averaging about 60% of all menus offered (although there is a dip in favor of 
the equilibrium menu in EA) 
While we postpone an in-depth analysis of the determinants of the contract menu 
choices, it is clear from the right panel of Table 4 that the profitability of a particular contract 
menu depends greatly on the environment.  Menus 1 and 2 yield highest profits for the 
principal in the EA treatment, but generate low profits in the B and EP treatments.  Similarly, 
menu 6 is quite unattractive for the principal in the EA and B treatments, but provides nearly 
the best profits in the EP treatment (and the best in the final periods).  Overall, we observe a 
good correspondence between the most frequent offers made and their profitability; thus, to a 
large extent, it seems that principals are influenced by considerations of their own profits. 
Agent behavior 
The menus accepted by the agents naturally mirror the menus that were offered; 
however, there are some substantial differences, due primarily to rejections in the B treatment 
and selection pressures in the EP treatment.  More favorable menus are more likely to be 
accepted in the B treatment, with 142 rejections of the 800 contract menus offered.  The 
acceptance rate is 90% for menu 4, 75% for menu 3, but only 61% for menu 1.  In addition, 
less favorable menus are not likely to be selected by agents in the EP treatment although 
rejections of offers from both principals occurred only twice.  The punishment for offering an 
unfavorable contract menu is simply that no agent will select it.  Menus 1 to 3 are only 
accepted about 5% of the time; in fact, these menus were never accepted in the final eight 
periods, and menu 4 was only accepted two of the 144 times it was offered in these periods.  
Finally, rejections in the EA treatment are not actually costly for the principal, since an offer 
has always been accepted by at least one agent.  
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We summarize agent behavior by listing the number of accepted menus (column 1), 
the rate of acceptance (column 2), and the proportion of X option chosen (column 3) in each 
treatment in Table 5 for the high-ability agents and Table 6 for the low-ability agents. 
Table 5 – High-ability agents' choices, by treatment  
B treatment  EA treatment  EP treatment Menu 
Offer Nb %accept % X Nb %accept % X Nb %accept % X 
1 36 80.00 0 271 94.76 63.10 1  5.00 0 
2 6  60.00 0 46 93.88 71.74 0  0.00 - 
3 97  94.17 57.73 513 98.28 94.54 2  8.70 100 
4 191  95.50  79.06 82  100 95.12 10 16.95 80.00 
5 37 100 86.49 16 100 93.75 102 39.23 98.04 
6 5 100 60.00 5 100 80.00 245 70.61 68.16 
Total 372  93.00 65.06 933 97.19 84.24 360 50.00 76.94 
 
Table 6 – Low-ability agents' choices, by treatment  
B treatment  EA treatment  EP treatment Menu Offer 
Nb %accept % X Nb %accept % X Nb %accept % X 
1 18  40.91 11.11 212 82.49 1.42 4  11.11 0 
2 2  28.57 0 47  88.68 0 0  0.00 0 
3 85  61.15 2.35 446 85.44 0 2 5.88 0 
4 134  83.23 2.98 92  100 0 18 23.38 0 
5 36 94.74 5.56 32 100 0 99 43.04 0 
6 11  100 9.09 4  100 0 235 72.09 0 
Total 286  71.50 3.85 833 86.77 0 358 49.72 0 
Note: Equilibrium menus are in bold. 
 
 The rejection rate for low-ability agents is always much higher than the rate for high-
ability agents, more than four times as high in both treatments B and EA.  When they accept an 
offer, low-ability agents rarely (14 of 1477 times, or 0.95%) chose option X, which would 
generate negative earnings.  The behavior of high-ability agents is more complex.  Note that 
option X pays more than option Y for high-ability types with menus 3-5, but option Y pays 
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more with menus 1 and 2.  In addition, both options give the same payoff to the high-ability 
type with menu 6.  In the EP treatment, high-ability agents nearly always maximize own 
payoffs (356 of 360 non-rejections).  While they also do so with menus 1, 2, 5, and 6 in 
treatment B, we observe a substantial proportion of option-Y choices with menus 3 and 4 
(42% and 21% of the non-rejection choices, respectively).   
In the EA treatment, the principals know the agents’ choices prior to selecting one, so 
that agents must compete in their choices to be selected.  High-ability agents do maximize 
own profits with menus 3-5, since this maximization also coincides with maximizing the 
profits for the principal.  However, with menus 1 and 2, an agent who myopically chooses 
option Y runs the risk that she will not be selected if another agent has chosen option X.  Since 
some agents appear to realize this, we see that 64% of the high-ability agents choose option X 
when accepting menus 1 or 2.  Figure 4 shows that high-ability agents appear to be learning to 
do so over time, as this likelihood increases during the first half of the sessions.
13
  We also 
chart menu 3 for comparison, to show a ‘best-case scenario’ for the X option, since a high-
ability agent trying to compete should always choose it; note the lack of a time trend. 
Figure 4: Likelihood of X Option over Time in EA, 
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As a consequence of these decisions, the proportion of high-ability agents actually 
recruited is larger in EA (81%) than in B (57%).  While in B this distortion of the initial 
distribution of the population reflects the higher frequency of rejections of offers by low-
ability agents, in EA this reflects the process of selection related to the competitive 
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environment.  In EP, the proportion of high-ability agents (50%) corresponds roughly to the 
initial distribution of the population since almost all the agents accept an offer.  Regarding the 
evolution over time of the proportion of high-ability agents, the selection process does not take 
a long time before being fully operative in EA, whereas there is almost no evolution in B.  The 
percentage of high type among the agents recruited in EA rises from 71% in periods 1 to 8 up 
to 87% in periods 9 to 16 and stays above 81% in the following periods, whereas the 
proportion stays between 55% and 57% in B throughout the game. 
5.2 Regression analysis 
It appears that there are substantial and significant differences in both principal and 
agent behavior across treatments.  We now turn to multiple-regression analysis of the 
determinants of the observed behavior, first considering the menus offered by principals.
 14,15
  
In order to disentangle the motivations underlying offers of the different categories of menus, 
we estimate multinomial Logit models in which the reference category is the offer of the 
equilibrium menu.  To better understand the choice of the most frequent menu that is not the 
equilibrium one, we also estimate ordered Probit models with robust standard errors in which 
the switch to the most frequent menu offer is the dependent variable, equal to +1 if the menu 
increased, 0 if unchanged, and -1 if it decreased.   In all the regressions, we include a time 
trend to identify a possible evolution over time.  The first three columns of Table 7 presents 
the results of the multinomial Logit model and the fourth column the results of the ordered 
Probit model for the contract menus chosen in the B treatment.  
                                                                                                                                                         
13
 An indirect consequence of this pattern is that principals in the EA treatment are increasingly successful in 
obtaining option X in response to menu 1 or menu 2.  Overall, option X was obtained 67% of the time in response 
to these menus; this proportion was 63% during the first 20 periods and 72% during the last 20 periods. 
14
 All of these estimations were done using Stata9, with robust standard errors and clustering at the individual 
level to account for the fact that a same individual makes several decisions over time. 
15
 We also performed nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, with both session-level and individual-level 
data (see Appendix B).  These tests find that the average menu offered is lowest in the EA sessions and highest in 
the EP sessions.  They also indicate that rejection rates of menus below 4 are significantly higher in the B than in 
the EA treatments and that high-ability agents in B are more likely to choose option X in response to menus 1 and 
2 than in EA, the reverse being true for menu 3.  Overall, they show that the proportion of high-ability agents is 
higher in EA than in B. 
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Table 7: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Benchmark Treatment  
 Multinomial Logit model  Ordered Probit model 
Ref.: offer of the 
equilibrium menu 
Offer of 
menus 1 - 2 
Offer of 
menu 4 
Offer of 
menus 5 - 6 
Switch to menu 4 
Time trend  
 
Lagged rejection 
rate 
X option chosen 
in (t-1) 
Constant 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
0.043** 
(0.022) 
-1.366*** 
(0.432) 
-0.376 
(0.440) 
0.057*** 
(0.014) 
-0.053** 
(0.022) 
0.176 
(0.171) 
-0.053 
(0.292) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.020) 
-0.355 
(0.334) 
-1.183*** 
(0.462) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
-0.321** 
(0.166) 
 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Pseudo R
2
 
641 
-701.339 
38.07 
0.000 
0.087 
316 
-219.847 
8.13 
0.043 
0.028 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in 
parentheses) and clustering at the individual level; *** and ** denote two-tailed 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Menus 1 and 2 are chosen less frequently over the course of the sessions, while menu 4 
is increasingly preferred to menu 3 in the latter periods of the sessions. The offer of very 
generous menus 5 or 6 (11% of offers) does not follow a clear trend.  A principal who 
experiences a high proportion of rejections of his previous offers is more likely to offer menus 
1-2 and less likely to offer menu 4.  This may suggest some inertia in the motivations driving 
behavior.  Indeed, a principal who is driven by social preferences makes more generous offers, 
experiences fewer rejections, and is encouraged to continue to offer generous menus.  An 
agent choosing the X option in the previous period (which never occurs in response to menu 1 
or 2) decreases the likelihood of menu 1 or 2 being chosen by the principal. This makes sense 
because offering these menus would induce both types to switch to the low option.   
The ordered Probit regression regarding switching from any menu to the most frequent 
menu 4 shows that such a switch is more frequent at the beginning of the game.  It is less 
likely if the agent has chosen the X option in the previous period, with no significance for 
whether the principal has experienced a high proportion of rejections in the past.  In contrast, a 
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similar regression in which the lagged option is replaced by the rejection of the menu offer in 
the previous period (not reported here) indicates that a rejection strongly favors such a switch.  
Overall, these regressions suggest that offering a more generous menu than the equilibrium is 
driven by the experience of recent rejections and the selection of low-type agents, whereas 
offering very generous menus (5 or 6) does not depend on any of these variables, suggesting a 
preference for more egalitarian outcomes.  
Table 8 presents the results for the menus chosen in the EA treatment.   In the first two 
columns, we pool together the offers of menus 4 to 6 since they represent only 12% of the 
observations.  The third column displays the results of the ordered Probit model in which the 
switch to the most frequent menu 3 is explained.  In contrast with the previous regression, we 
do not consider the lagged rejection rate since all the contracts are accepted.  
Table 8: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Agent Treatment 
 Multinomial Logit model Ordered Probit model 
Ref.: offer of the 
equilibrium menu 
Offer of 
menu 3 
Offer of 
menus 4 - 6 
Switch to menu 3 
Time trend 
 
X option chosen in 
(t-1) 
X option * menu 1-2 in 
(t-1) 
Constant 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
1.673*** 
(0.464) 
-3.679*** 
(0.738) 
-0.235 
(0.473) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
0.345 
(0.369) 
-2.228*** 
(0.695) 
-0.121 
(0.456) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.758*** 
(0.239) 
 
 
 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Pseudo R
2
 
624 
-466.574 
34.39 
0.000 
0.212 
345 
-194.053 
10.40 
0.006 
0.041 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; *** and ** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Menu 3 is chosen more frequently over time (we know from an alternative regression 
that this is particularly the case in periods 17-32, significant at 1%), whereas the frequency of 
menus 4-6 decreases but not significantly (it decreases significantly in the final eight periods, 
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at the 5% level).  If the X option was chosen in the previous period in response to the offer of 
the equilibrium menu, this decreases the likelihood of non-equilibrium menus being offered; 
this makes sense, since the X option leads to a higher payoff for the principal, and so there is 
less motivation to offer a more generous menu.  On the other hand, if the X option was chosen 
in the previous period (in reaction to whichever offers), this increases the likelihood of menu 3 
being chosen but this has no significant effect on the offer of menu 4-6.  If we separate out the 
case when menu 3 is chosen (column 3), we see that switching to menu 3 is much less likely 
when the X option has been chosen in the previous period. 
Table 9 presents the results for the contract menus chosen in the Excess Principal 
treatment.  In the first two columns, we estimate multinomial Logit models with menu 6 as the 
reference.  We pool menus 1 to 4 since they only represent 19% of the observations.  We 
include among the independent variables both the lagged acceptance of the principal’s offer 
and the lagged rejection rate instead of the lagged option chosen by the agent, in order not to 
eliminate half of the observations and because both the principal and the high-type agent are 
indifferent between the two options with menu 6.  Column 3 displays the results of a Probit 
model in which the switch to both the equilibrium and most frequent menu offer is the 
explained variable.
16
   
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Indeed, an ordered Probit model would not be appropriate because data are censored at menu 6. 
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Table 9: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Principal Treatment 
Multinomial Logit model  Probit model  
Ref.: offer of the 
equilibrium menu 
Offer of 
menus 1-4 
Offer of 
menu 5 
Switch to menu 6 
Time trend 
 
Acceptance of the offer 
in (t-1) 
Lagged rejection rate 
 
Constant 
-0.083*** 
(0.011) 
-0.166 
(0.223) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.929* 
(0.517) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.111 
(0.175) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.392 
(0.516) 
-0.040*** 
(0.008) 
-1.800*** 
(0.163) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.608 
(0.495) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Pseudo R
2
 
1404 
-1312.510 
125.25 
0.000 
0.090 
671 
-268.284 
136.65 
0.000 
0.350 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; *** and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The offer of less egalitarian menus than menu 6 decreases strongly over time.  
Although the acceptance of the offer in the previous period has little effect on the choice of 
any kind of menu, there is a strong and positive correlation between a high rejection rate in the 
past and the offer of less generous menus.  In contrast, the Probit regression regarding 
switching to menu 6 shows that an offer rejected in the previous period makes such a switch 
more likely, while the overall lagged rejection rate exerts is no longer significant.  The switch 
is also more likely in the early periods of the game.  The competitive pressure to choose a 
favorable menu is naturally a major factor in the principal’s choice of contract to offer. 
Another approach is to focus directly on whether a principal changes the contract 
menu from one period to the next.
17
  We might expect that a principal who is primarily 
interested in maximizing his own payoff would change the contract menu offered on the basis 
of expected profit, so that the payoff received from the previous menu offered would be 
critical.  We consider this factor, along with a time trend in the following ordered Probit 
                                                 
17
  A possible limitation is that the menu change is censored if the prior menu was 1 or 6 in these regressions. 
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regressions in which data from all treatments are pooled.  Menu change is the dependent 
variable, equal to +1 if the menu increased, 0 if unchanged, and -1 if it decreased.  The results 
of these regressions are reported in Table 10: 
Table 10: Contract menu changes and lagged payoffs (ordered Probit models) 
Menu change Independent variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Lagged principal's payoff -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
B* lagged principal's payoff - - -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
EP* lagged principal's payoff - - -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Period - -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Nb observations 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
Wald χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Pseudo R2 
2808 
-2672.873 
26.30 
0.000 
0.006 
2808 
-2669.768 
32.82 
0.000 
0.007 
2808 
-2637.759 
60.99 
0.000 
0.019 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; *** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
In all cases, the lagged payoff is a significant determinant of whether or not the 
principal left the contract menu unchanged.  Menus increased (decreased) when the previous 
payoff was lower, as with rejection or the Y option being chosen.  When we consider lagged 
payoffs separately for each treatment, we find that the coefficient is significantly negative in 
the EA treatment, and is even more negative (and significant) in the B and EP treatments.  The 
effect of lagged payoffs is strongest in the EP treatment, as not being chosen generates a low 
payoff and so is avoided.  We also observe a negative time trend in all cases. An additional 
regression (not reported here) indicates little difference in this trend across treatments. 
We next analyze the agents' decisions of whether to accept a contract menu and (for 
high-ability agents) which option to choose if accepting a contract.  Table 11 shows Probit 
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regressions for the three treatments.  Note that regarding the EP treatment, we explain the 
likelihood of an acceptance from the principal’s and not from the agent’s point of view since, 
with the exception of two rejections of both offers, the agent always accepts one offer and 
selects the best one among the two, or chooses at random in case of a tie. 
Table 11: Determinants of accepting a contract offer (Probit models) 
 
Decision to 
accept the offer 
B and EA 
Treatments  
Benchmark 
Treatment 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
Excess Principal 
Treatment 
Time trend 
 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
High-type agent 
 
Offer 
 
Lagged offer 
 
Lagged % of  
no selection  
Constant 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.793*** 
(0.280) 
0.912*** 
(0.242) 
0.314*** 
(0.057) 
-0.029 
(0.035) 
 
 
-0.362 
(0.350) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
 
 
1.010*** 
(0.395) 
0.482*** 
(0.084) 
-0.102** 
(0.049) 
 
 
-0.485 
(0.474) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
 
 
1.322*** 
(0.400) 
0.186** 
(0.079) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.742 
(0.566) 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
 
 
-0.109 
(0.078) 
0.729*** 
(0.066) 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.235*** 
(0.342) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Pseudo R
2
 
2652 
-773.506 
49.43 
0.000 
0.157 
780 
-291.556 
38.19 
0.000 
0.209 
1832 
-363.406 
66.09 
0.000 
0.199 
1440 
-822.684 
127.62 
0.000 
0.176 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; ***, and ** denote two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
 
 In all three treatments, the table confirms that higher offers (indexed from 1 to 6) are 
more likely to be accepted.  High-ability agents in both the B and EA treatments are 
significantly more likely to accept an offered contract than are low-ability agents in these 
treatments.  This cannot influence offers’ acceptance in the EP treatment, since each type of 
agent is able to accept the best offer.  A couple of more ‘psychological’ factors come into play 
as well.  In the B treatment, agents are influenced by the previous contract offered to them; 
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holding the current offer constant, the better the previous offer, the less likely the agent will 
accept a contract offer.  This effect vanishes in the EA treatment, where we instead observe 
that an agent who was hired less often in the prior periods is significantly more likely to accept 
the current offer.  When we pool the EA and B data, we find that a contract is much more 
likely to be accepted in the EA treatment, illustrating the effect of competitive pressure. 
 We then explore the determinants of the option chosen by an agent who accepts a 
contract.  Since low-ability agents incur serious losses if they choose the X option, we focus 
only on high-ability agents.  Since the payoff for the high agent is the same for menu 6, 
regardless of the option chosen, we also omit this menu (5 observations in B and in EA) and 
the EP treatment, where it prevails, from the analysis. These estimations are displayed in 
Table 12. 
Table 12: Determinants of the choice of option X by the high-type agents who accepted 
an offer (Probit models) 
 
Choice of option X Benchmark Treatment Excess Agent Treatment 
Time trend 
 
Accepted contract 
 
Lagged selection  
 
Constant 
-0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.840*** 
(0.203) 
 
 
-2.279*** 
(0.605) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.537*** 
(0.102) 
0.343*** 
(0.117) 
-0.508** 
(0.239) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald χ2 
Prob>χ2 
Pseudo R2 
367 
-183.352 
24.52 
0.000 
0.227 
886 
-308.427 
34.47 
0.000 
0.165 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; *** and ** denote two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
 
Not surprisingly, the higher the contract, the more likely the high agent is to choose 
option X. Option X is chosen less frequently over time in the B treatment, as it seems that 
high-ability agents develop a taste for more favorable contracts and make modest sacrifices by 
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choosing Y instead of X (rather than costly rejections) to punish the principal for a lack of 
generosity in choosing low menus.   In contrast, option X is chosen more frequently (but not 
significantly so) over time in the EA treatment since the high-ability agents also learn to make 
modest sacrifices, by choosing X instead of Y when they accept contracts 1 or 2, to increase 
the likelihood of their hiring. Finally, we see a significant effect in the EA treatment of having 
been hired in the previous period.  
 
6. WELFARE AND EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS 
Welfare comparisons across treatments are complicated for at least two reasons.  One 
is that in EA and EP there is an unbalanced structure of principals and agents, so that some 
parties remain unmatched.  The right assumption in this case, we think, is to consider only the 
individuals who are actually matched; equivalently, one might think of this is how much 
benefit society derives from a match.  More importantly, the numbers of matches with the 
high-ability agents is likely to be higher in the EA treatment, which necessarily gives a boost 
to the total payoffs in this treatment.  In order to deal with this, we supply separate 
comparisons matches involving high- and low-ability agents.  Finally, the kinds of theoretical 
distortions at the equilibrium are different in the EP treatment (where the high-ability agents’ 
contract forces them to work more than the efficient level) than in either the EA or the B 
treatments (where the low-ability types work less than the efficient level).
18
 
Having said this, the equilibrium prediction (given by equation (3)) of the EA treatment 
seems unambiguously better when compared with the B treatment (given by equation (1)).19  
There is a higher proportion of the matches with the more productive high-ability agents in EA 
than in B.  In addition, in the equilibrium of the EA treatment there is less distortion for the 
high agent than in the equilibrium of B; this can be seen in both equation (3’) and Table 1.  
                                                 
18
 There are three potential sources of inefficiency.  One is that an agent might choose the wrong contract given 
her type.  As shown in Tables 5 and 6, this is relatively rare and occurs mostly in the case of indifference or near-
indifference.  A second source is that agents may reject contracts, which we see happens with some frequency, 
particularly in the EP treatment.  The third source is that principals offer the wrong contracts; since this seems 
driven by rejections, our sense is that rejections are (either directly or indirectly) the main source of inefficiency.  
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The comparison between the B and the EP treatment is theoretically more complicated, 
since the distortion occurs for different individuals, the high-ability agents in the EP treatment 
and the low-ability agents in the B treatment.  But since we expect an equal number of high- 
and low-ability agents to be matched in both cases, we can compare the relative value of the 
distortions of high and low types in both treatments.  The loss in welfare with respect to first 
best (in equilibrium) for the low-ability agents’ contract in B is 
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e . With our parameterization, the loss in B is 0.03 
whereas the loss in EP is 0.12. Thus, in our experimental framework, the equilibrium in EP 
would lead to lower overall welfare than the equilibrium in B, which in turn would lead to 
lower overall welfare than the equilibrium in EA.  
With the contract menus and payoff parameters we chose, we find that the greatest 
benefits accrue to society from a match when there are many agents competing to be hired.  If 
we consider the theoretical predictions regarding efficiency, we should observe menu 1 or 2 in 
EA, menu 3 in B, and menu 6 in EP.  While only half of the matches in B and EP would 
involve high-ability agents, 87.50% (on average) of the matches in EA should be with high-
ability agents.  So in EA (with menu 2, the worst case for efficiency), the average total payoff 
should be 720, in B the average total payoff should be 620, and in EP the average total payoff 
should be 572.50.  EA gives the most efficiency; the EA > B > EP ordering also matches the 
pattern for accepted contracts. 
The data show a qualitatively similar pattern.  The overall average payoffs per 
treatment, which are a direct measure of efficiency since they take into account both the type 
and the effort of the recruited agents, are ordered in the same manner as that predicted 
theoretically.  These welfare considerations/average payoffs are shown in Table 13: 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
19
 As we noted previously, the EA treatment has other equilibria, and we selected the contracts of one of those 
equilibria for one of the available menus in the experiment. The equilibrium given by (3) is the one, however, that 
seems more relevant for the data. 
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Table 13: Welfare comparisons (average total payoffs) across treatments 
Variable B treatment EA treatment EP treatment 
Average total payoff 538.46 698.97 590.42 
Total payoff if contract accepted 600.71 698.97 591.36 
Total payoff if H accepts contract 687.89 749.33 672.67 
Total payoff if L accepts contract 487.31 480.75 509.61 
  
We see that the EA treatment easily yields the highest average total payoff (line 1).  
One reason for this is that (ex post) every contract is accepted by at least one of the paired 
agents in the EA treatment.  The EP treatment slightly dominates B in terms of average total 
payoff since only 2 agents reject the offer of both principals, while the B treatment has a 
substantial rejection rate.  Nevertheless, if we ‘level the playing field’ by considering only 
accepted contracts, the EA treatment still generates the highest degree of efficiency.  Mann-
Whitney tests find that the total payoffs are higher in EA than in both B (Z = 1.85 and p = 
0.06) and EP (Z = 2.14 and p = 0.03).  One reason why EA empirically yields higher payoffs 
than B or EP is for one of the two theoretical reasons: the possibility of selection means that 
there are more matches with high-ability agents in EA (81%, against 57% in B and 50% in EP) 
and these yield higher total payoffs per match. 
Nevertheless, even if there were an equal number of matches with high- and low-
ability agents in EA, it would still be the treatment with the highest total payoffs, either with or 
without rejections (615.04).   Note, however, that our theory over-predicts payoffs in the 
presence of competition among agents and under-predicts them in the presence of competition 
between principals.  The total payoff in EA is slightly under the predicted 720 (p = 0.040, 
according to a t-test), whereas the total payoff in B is not different from the predicted 620 (p = 
0.420) and it is even higher in the EP treatment than the predicted 572.50 (p = 0.004).   
If we only consider welfare with low-ability agents, the best treatment is the EP 
treatment.  Perhaps this is because high- and low-ability agents each net the principal the same 
profits, regardless of the option chosen, and so are equivalent in some sense.  However, option 
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X is so relatively inefficient in menu 6 (total payoffs of 635, compared to 760 with all other 
menus) that the EP treatment cannot be the best overall.  
One immediately wonders just how robust the EA-efficiency result is to alternative 
specifications.  The EA treatment is necessarily better than the benchmark, since when the 
number of excess agents goes to infinity, there is no distortion for even low-ability agents, so 
we obtain first-best efficiency (proof upon request).  The comparison with EP is a matter of 
parameterization, for fixed numbers (3) of excess agents.  With EP the outcome is the same no 
matter how many principals you have, so there would always be some inefficiency.  Thus, 
there is a sense in which EA is ‘best’, if the relative number of agents can grow large. 
However, this conclusion about the higher efficiency of the EA institutional 
environment should be qualified if we account for those agents who get unmatched.  If the EA 
environment provides the biggest benefit to society from a match, it may generate a higher 
social cost than the benchmark if the unmatched agents remain unemployed.  Including all 
participants, the average individual payoff amounts to 269 in B, 237 in EA and 238 in EP.  
Therefore, there may be a dilemma: a higher competitive pressure among agents helps in 
getting closer to the first-best efficiency with the matched agents but could generate a higher 
social cost related to the unmatched agents if these ones, especially the low type, do not get an 
alternative occupation.  We acknowledge that our measure of welfare, based on the total 
surplus, is purely utilitarian, and a Rawlsian approach would somewhat qualify our 
conclusions. 
7. CONCLUSION 
We conducted an experiment based on a model of contracting under asymmetric 
information.  We show theoretically that, in this context, various degrees of relative bargaining 
power affect outcomes and efficiency.   In this environment, efficiency improves in the 
relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly 
power.  However, this environment also generates high inequality levels and is characterized 
by multiple equilibria, which may have important behavioral implications in the field and 
suggests that empirical testing could produce valuable insights 
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Our results provide qualitative support for the theory.  We find that the institutional 
environment in which agents compete against each other is indeed the most efficient one.  We 
also show that behavior evolves over time.  People make errors, learn and adjust their 
decisions accordingly in order to increase their payoffs.  In particular, the payoff obtained in 
the previous period, especially related to the ability to separate between types, is a driving 
force of the evolution of principals’ menu offers.  Our results also indicate that principals offer 
more generous menus than predicted, although less frequently in the context of competition. 
These results question the interaction between the various degrees of bargaining power 
and social preferences.  In many experimental papers, social preferences are shown to interfere 
with the predictions of standard contract theory.  In our treatment without competition, we also 
observe that principals offer menus of contracts that are more generous than the equilibrium.  
When agents compete, principals tend also to offer more generous contract menus than the 
equilibrium, but this is less the case when they are able to separate the agents by type with the 
equilibrium menus; this calls into question the true generosity of these offers.  In addition, the 
existence of social preferences can hardly change the outcome for the low-ability type agents:  
due to the heterogeneity among agents, offering a more generous menu increases the selected 
agent’s expected payoff but also increases the likelihood of the repeated exclusion of the low-
ability agents.   
Finally, the superiority of the institutional environment with competition among agents 
is shown in terms of total surplus of the matched pairs.  The higher total surplus is achieved by 
making the payoff of the principal higher and lowering those of the agents.  Thus, there is a 
genuine tradeoff between equity and efficiency in this environment, both theoretically and 
empirically.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500. 
Anderhub, V., Gächter, S., and Königstein, M. (2002), Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a 
Simple Principal-Agent Experiment. Experimental Economics 5(1), 5-27. 
 35 
Ausubel, L.M. (1999). Adverse Selection in the Credit Card Market. Mimeo, University of 
Maryland. 
Banks, J., Camerer, C.F., and Porter, D. (1994). An experimental analysis of Nash refinements 
in signaling games. Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 1-31. 
Berg, J.E., Daley, L.A., Dickhaut, J.W. and O’Brien, J. (1992) Moral Hazard  and Risk 
Sharing: Experimental Evidence. Research in Experimental Economics,  5, 1-34. 
Brandts, J., and Holt, C. (1992). An experimental test of equilibrium dominance in signaling 
games. American Economic Review, 82, 1350-1365. 
Brandts, J., and Charness, G. (2004). Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? 
Some Experimental Evidence. Economic Journal, 114, 684-708. 
Bull, C., Schotter, A., and Weigelt, K. (1987). Tournaments and Piece-Rates: An 
Experimental Study. Journal of Political Economy, 95(1), 1-33. 
Cabrales, A., and Charness, G. (2000). Optimal contracts with team production and hidden 
information: An experiment. Mimeo, University of California at Santa Barbara.  
Cawley, J., and Philipson, T. (1999). An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to 
Trade in Insurance. American Economic Review, 89, 827-846. 
Charness, G., and Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and Partnership. Econometrica, 74, 
1579-1601. 
Charness, G., and Dufwenberg, M. (2008). Contracts and Communication. Mimeo. 
Charness, G., Kuhn, P. and Villeval, M.C. (2008), Competition and the Ratchet Effect. IZA 
Discussion Paper 3784, Bonn. 
Charness, G., and Rabin, M. (2002).  Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 817-869, 
Chaudhuri, A. (1998). The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs: An 
experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37, 291-304. 
Chiappori, P.A., and Salanié, B. (2000). Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance 
Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 108, 56-78. 
Chiappori, P.A., and Salanié, B. (2003). Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent 
Work in Dewatripont, M., Hansen, L., and Turnovsky, S. (Eds), Advances in Economics 
and Econometrics, Vol 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cooper, D., Kagel, J., Lo, W., and Gu, Q.L. (1999). Gaming against managers in incentive 
systems: Experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers. American 
Economic Review, 89, 781-804. 
Dahlby, B. (1983). Adverse Selection and Statistical Discrimination: An Analysis of Canadian 
Automobile Insurance. Journal of Public Economics, 20, 121-130. 
Davis, D., and Holt, C.A, (1994). Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice of Partner 
Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 39-53. 
 36 
DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., Lundholm, R., and Uecker, W.C. (1985). A Laboratory Investigation 
of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship, Journal of Accounting 
Research, 23, 81-120. 
Dione, G., Doherty, N. (1994). Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extension 
to and Evidence from Insurance Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 102 (2), 210-
235. 
Fehr, E., Kirchler, E.,  Weichbold, A., and  Gachter, S.  (1998). When social norms overpower 
competition: Gift exchange in experimental labor markets. Journal of Labor Economics, 
16, 324-351. 
Finkelstein, A., and Poterba, J. (2004). Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder 
Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market. Journal of Political Economy, 112 (1), 183-
208. 
Fischbacher, U., Fong, C.M., and Fehr, E. (2003). Fairness, Errors, and the Power of 
Competition. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich 
Working Paper n°133. 
Freixas, X., and Rochet, J.C. (1997). Microeconomics of Banking. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
Genesove, D. (1993). Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market. Journal of 
Political Economy, 104,  644-665. 
Greiner, B. (2004). An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments. In: K. Kremer, 
V. Macho (Eds.): Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht 63, 
Göttingen: Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung, 79-93. 
Grosskopf, B. (2003). Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with 
Responder Competition. Experimental Economics, 6, 141-158. 
Güth, W., Klose, W., Koenigstein, M., and Schwalbach, J. (1998). An Experimental Study of 
a Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationship, Managerial and Decision Economics, 19:327-
341.  
Holt, C.A., and Sherman, R. (1990). Advertising and product quality in posted-offer 
experiments. Ecnomic Inquiry, 28, 39-56. 
Kanemoto, Y., and MacLeod, B.W. (1992). The Ratchet Effect and the Market for 
Secondhand Workers. Journal of Labor Economics, 10(1), 85-98. 
Keser, C., and Willinger, M. (2000), Principals’  principles when agents’ actions are hidden. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18, 163-185. 
Königstein, M. (2001). Optimal Contracting with Boundedly Rational Agents, Homo 
oeconomicus, XVIII (2): 211-228. 
Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Lazear, E.P. (1999). Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 17(2), 199- 236. 
Lynch, M., Miller, R.M., Plott, C.R., and Porter, R. (1986). Product Quality, Consumer 
Information, and ‘Lemons’ in Experimental Markets, in Ippolito, M., and Scheffman, 
 37 
D.T. (Eds.), Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics. Washington, 
D.C. : Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 251-306. 
Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., and Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J. (1992). Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Miller, R.M., Plott, C.R. (1985). Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets. 
Econometrica, 53(4), 837-872. 
Mirrlees, J.A. (1971). An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of 
Economic Studies, 38(114), 175-208. 
Nalbantian, H.R., and Schotter, A. (1997). Productivity under Group Incentives: An 
Experimental Study. American Economic Review, 87,  314-41. 
Plott, C., and Wilde, L.L. (1982), Professional Diagnosis vs. Self-Diagnosis: An Experimental 
Investigation of Some Special Features of Markets with Uncertainty; Research in 
Experimental Economics, Vol.2; JAI Press, 63-112. 
Prendergast, C. (1999). The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 
37, 7-63. 
Puelz, R., and Snow, A. (1994). Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signalling and 
Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market. Journal of Political Economy, 102, 236-
257. 
Ray, D. (1998). Development Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Roth, A., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and Zamir, S. (1991).  Bargaining and Market 
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study. 
American Economic Review, 81(5), 1068-1095. 
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal 
of Finance, 16, 8-37. 
Wilson, R. (1993). Nonlinear Pricing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Young, P.H., and Burke, M.A. (2001). Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A 
Case Study of Illinois Agriculture. American Economic Review, 91, 559-573. 
Zeiliger, Romain, (2000). A Presentation of Regate, Internet Based Software for Experimental 
Economics. http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/~zeiliger/regate/RegateIntro.ppt., GATE. 
 38 
APPENDIX A - Instructions for the Excess Agent treatment
 
 (the instructions for the other 
treatments are available upon request) 
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making carried out by researchers from the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the University of California at Santa Barbara and GATE.  During this 
session, you can earn money.  The amount of your earnings depends on your decisions and on the 
decisions of the other participants in this session.  During the session, your earnings will be calculated 
in points,  
with 100 points = 1 Euro 
During the session, losses are possible.  However, they can be avoided with certainty by your 
decisions. 
The session consists of 40 independent periods.  Only 4 periods will be chosen at random for actual 
payment, at the end of the session.  The earnings you have made during these 4 periods will be added 
up and converted into Euros.  In addition, you will receive € 4 for participating in the experiment.  
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash in private to preserve confidentiality. Your decisions are 
anonymous and confidential. 
During this session, there are two categories of participants: 4 participants are proposers and 12 
participants are responders.  The responders can be of two types: A or B.  
The category to which the participant is assigned (proposer or responder) and the type of participant in 
the case the participant is a responder are chosen randomly at the beginning of the session. Each 
responder has an equal initial probability to be of either type A or type B.  Half of all responders will 
be of each type.  
You will be informed of your category and of your type if you are a responder at the beginning of the 
session and you will keep the same category and the same type throughout the session.  If you are a 
responder, no one knows your type. 
Description of each period 
At the beginning of each period, each proposer is randomly matched with 3 responders.  The 
responders may be either type, but the proposer does not know their types when making a proposal.  
The identity of your co-participants is unknown to you.  The composition of the group changes 
randomly every period. 
Each period consists of four stages. 
 In the first stage, the proposer makes a selection from one of 6 possible “offers” {1,2,3,4,5 or 
6} by checking a box on his screen. 
 In the second stage, the three responders are informed of this offer.  Each can then choose one 
either option X or option Y or “rejection” by checking the corresponding box on his screen.  
 In the third stage, the proposer is informed of the choices of the three responders.  If more 
than one responder has accepted the proposer’s offer, the proposer will select one of the 
responders among those who accepted his offer. He can accept at most one responder.  The 
responders are not informed about the choices made by the other responders. The responders 
who have not been selected receive a payoff of 125 points. 
 In the fourth stage, each person is informed of his own payoff in that period. 
 
How are payoffs calculated? 
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The payoffs depend on the offer made by the proposer, on the responders’ decisions and on the choice 
made by the proposer among the responders. When a proposer chooses a responder, his payoff 
depends only on his offer and on the option chosen by this responder; the responders who have not 
been selected do not provide him with any additional payoff.  
 
Please refer to the Table provided.  This Table displays the 6 possible offers and their associated 
payoffs. 
Corresponding to each offer, you can see 3 rows: 
- The first row, in blue, indicates the payoffs of the proposer.  
- The second row, in yellow, indicates the responder’s payoffs if his type is A. 
- The third row, in pink, indicates the responder’s payoffs if his type is B. 
The 3 columns represent the decisions made by the responder: 
- The column (1) corresponds to the choice of option X if the responder accepts the offer  
- The column (2) corresponds to the choice of option Y if the responder accepts the offer  
- The column (3) corresponds to the case of the responder rejects the offer. 
 
At the intersection of a row and a column, you can read the payoffs associated with an offer and a 
choice as a function of the role of proposer or responder. 
  
Here are some examples. 
Example 1. The proposer has chosen the offer 1.  One responder of type B has accepted this offer and 
chosen option Y.  The two other responders have rejected this offer.  In this case, the proposer will 
receive 355 points; the responder who has accepted the offer will receive 135 points; the responders 
who have rejected the offer will receive 125 points. 
Example 2. The proposer has chosen the offer 3.  One responder of type A and one responder of type 
B have accepted this offer and chosen option Y; the other responder of type A has also accepted the 
offer and chosen option X.  The proposer chooses the responder who chose option X.  The proposer 
will receive 550 points; the responder who has been chosen will receive 210 points; the responders 
who have not been chosen will receive 125 points. 
Example 3. If the proposer has chosen the offer 6 and if no responder has accepted his offer, both the 
proposer and the responders receive 125 points. 
 
To sum up, in each period, if you are a proposer, you choose an offer from among the six feasible 
options and you choose between the responders who have accepted your offer; you cannot accept 
more than one responder.  If you are a responder, you choose either option X or option Y or you 
reject the offer.  Your payoffs for the current period are then computed. 
At the end of a period, a new period starts automatically.  Each period is independent.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.  Your questions 
will be immediately answered in private.  Throughout the entire session, direct communication 
between participants is strictly forbidden.  
 
APPENDIX B - Nonparametric tests 
 
Our nonparametric tests are Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, conducted with both 
session-level and individual-level data.  In a strict sense each session is only one independent 
observation, since there is interaction between parties over the course of each session.  Table A 
presents a summary of principal and agent choices in each of our sessions. 
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Table A: Session-level data 
B treatment  EA treatment  EP treatment Variables 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
Average offer 3.41 3.50 2.53 2.51 2.07 3.04 5.08 5.11 5.05 
Rejection rates (M 1, 2 & 3) 0.23 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.04 - - - 
High agent-option X (M 1& 2) 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.50 0.82 0.56 - - - 
High agent-option X (M 3) 0.75 0.26 0.87 0.96 1.00 0.96 - - - 
% high type (actual contracts) 0.56 0.57 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
The average contract menu offered is lowest in the four EA sessions and highest in the three 
EP sessions.  Rank-sum tests find Z = 2.12 and p = 0.03, comparing between EA and EP, Z = 1.85 and 
p = 0.06 for the comparison between EA and B, and Z =1.73 and p = 0.08 for the comparison between 
B and EP.  The likelihood that EA < B < EP (for average menu offered) is only p = 0.004.  Principals 
offer significantly different contract menus in each treatment. 
We also see that rejection rates of the less generous menus (1-3) are substantially higher in 
both B sessions than in any of the four EA sessions, yielding Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06.
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  In addition, 
high-ability agents in the B treatment are less likely to choose option X in response to menus 1 and 2 
than are high-ability agents in the EA treatment (insufficient observations in the EP treatment); recall 
that the myopic profit-maximizing choice in the EA treatment is Y.  As the rate is lower in both B 
sessions than in any of the four EA sessions; this gives Z = 1.88 and p = 0.06.  The rate of option X 
being chosen by the high agent is lower in both B sessions than in any of the four EA sessions, with Z 
= 1.85 and p = 0.06.  This is consistent with the fact that the offer of menu 3 is already more 
‘generous’ than the equilibrium in the EA treatment.  Finally, the proportion of high-ability agents in 
the actual contracts is higher in the EA sessions than in the B sessions (Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06) and it is 
smaller than a random draw of 0.875 (p = 0.04, t-test).   This proportion is also higher in the B than in 
the EP sessions (p = 0.08) and it is larger than a random draw of 0.50 (p = 0.01, t-test). 
Since we have only a few sessions in each treatment, we supplement these tests by collapsing 
the 40 choices of each participant to one number; while this approach ignores the interaction between 
parties, we feel it is nevertheless informative.  These results confirm the patterns above, but with a 
higher degree of statistical significance.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests find that there are 
significant differences in the average menu offered between each pair of treatments (Z = 3.99, 5.71, 
and 5.69 for EA vs. B, EA vs. EP, and B vs. EP, respectively; all of these test statistics give p < 0.001).  
The test also indicates that the rejection rates of menus 1-3 are significantly higher in the B treatment 
than in the EA treatment (Z = 2.60, p = 0.01). Finally, the test confirms that the proportion of high-
ability agents in the actual contracts is larger in the EA than in the B treatment (Z = 4.36, p < 0.001) 
but this test fails when comparing the B and EP treatments (Z = 1.56, p = 0.11). 
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 We choose menus 1-3 as there are few rejections of menus 4-6 and these all occurred in the B treatment. 
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